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Abstract 
Presents the author's evolving views of the best current positions on certain core 
philosophical and psychological problems as they developed over time. These 
positions together suggest a skeptical or nihilist perspective modified by 
evolutionary psychology and contemporary philosophy that embraces our desire 
to live as best we can and the relative and psychological reality of values, free 
will and other phenomena while recognizing limitations on their foundations and 
our understanding. The below makes no claims to originality for most of the ideas 
expressed, drawing on a range of mostly unreferenced texts that will be familiar 
to philosophers and psychologists working in this area. 
(June, 2005) 
1. The origin of the universe cannot be understood. 
We can see no reason why the universe exists, and it doesn't seem we could 
ever find one. Any explanation would become part of what has to be explained. 
This is the familiar but no less profound possibility of always asking "why?": any 
explanation becomes part of what is to be explained. Given the way our minds 
are constructed, no final satisfactory explanation seems possible. Even a newly 
discovered law of physics would pose the question as to why that should be the 
case -- why anything should exist at all or ever come into existence (see, for 
example, Nozick, 1981, or Krellenstein, 1995). 
1.1 The Big Bang is not a complete explanation for the origin of the universe. 
The Big Bang may explain the origin of the universe but it only provides an 
explanation up to a certain point in time...or perhaps to the beginning of time 
itself. It does not explain why there should be space-time or laws of physics that 
might allow a Big Bang and a universe to emerge from nothing at all. Some 
object that the question of an explanation or prior cause for the Big Bang is 
meaningless -- how could there be a cause prior in time when there isn't even 
time itself? In that case the creation of the universe from nothing, or an equally 
mysterious infinite sequence of a universe being born and dying (or an infinity of 
universes), is itself the final answer. But if it is the answer it is one that seems 
complete or literally incomprehensible. Wittgenstein said: "It is not how things are 
in the world that is mystical but that it exists" (1961, p. 149). 
1.2 An incomprehensible explanation for the universe is possible. 
It's possible that a final explanation for the origin of the universe exists but cannot 
be known by us. Such an explanation, even if incomprehensible, seems more 
likely and more desirable than a universe that came into being from simply 
nothing. Perhaps this is because the explanation at least satisfies the deep-
seated belief that everything has an explanation. The existence of this 
incomprehensible explanation might be confirmed by meeting an alien species 
that convinces us there is more to the brute existence of the universe than we 
ourselves can comprehend. Or maybe our minds will someday evolve (or just be 
sufficiently educated/modified?) to the point where other forms of satisfactory 
explanation are possible. Perhaps those who are already satisfied that the 
ultimate origin of the universe is a meaningless or a fully answered question 
already have such minds.  
1.3 A theory of the universe that compels its own existence is unlikely. 
It's been suggested that an explanation or theory for the origin of the universe 
could be found that compels it own existence and leaves no further question. But 
we have no idea what such a theory might look like and no reason to think such a 
theory is possible. 
2. Morality has no absolute rational foundation. 
There is no successful chain of reasoning that has been offered as to why we 
must adopt any fundamental moral obligation or value over another, or any at 
all...the very concept of an objective moral truth that commands obedience is, to 
use Mackie's term, 'queer' (1977). That people often do or seem to act this way is 
clear, as it is that many values and behaviors are shared and others are not. But 
there is no knockdown argument we can offer someone who believes deeply in a 
fundamental value we do not share, or in its greater importance than another 
value (cf. some arguments over abortion that set the sanctity of any form of 
unique human life against the right of control over one's own body). The variation 
in moral beliefs across people/cultures and time (despite attempts to rationalize 
such differences) argues against the possibility that, despite their queerness, 
there simply do exist common moral obligations (this is Mackie's 'argument from 
relativity'). (It might be argued that the belief that there are no absolute 
foundations is itself an absolute foundational belief. It may be foundational but, 
rather than absolute, it is an observation that no rational argument has 
established such values, and it leaves open at least the possibility that an 
argument could be offered that proves otherwise.) 
 2.1 Moral agreement and disagreement are ultimately arbitrary. 
We may judge another's behavior morally wrong to indicate its inconsistency with 
our deepest feelings and principles about how people should treat each other, 
principles (if principles are articulated rather than only feelings/behavior 
expressed) such as respect for an individual's rights, maximizing the greatest 
good, acceptance of a social contract, a particular sense of justice, the word of 
God or whatever we believe comprises and justifies that belief (some will also 
count as within the purview of morality behaviors aimed only or primarily at 
ourselves, such as suicide or drug use). Moral obligations are also experienced 
as commands (if not always absolute commands) that apply equally to everyone. 
But any underlying emotion or principle we assert to another as primary is 
arbitrary in the absence of agreement over its overriding value. We may claim 
that certain values are built in through evolution, are consistent with our survival 
as individuals or a species or tend to maximize pleasure or happiness of the 
individual or group. But none of those justify particular values without agreement 
on the underlying value of what is innate or productive of survival or pleasure, 
and agreement on values does not by itself imply obligations (vs. desirability) 
regarding them. This does not prevent us from reasoning with those with whom 
we share at least some values (or perceived obligations) to show that a behavior 
(or what results from it) is in fact consistent or inconsistent with those shared 
values, and such arguments occupy much of what counts as moral debate. 
Some disagreements can also be seen as disagreements over the purported 
facts of the matter -- whether animals are conscious, whether one group of 
people represents an inherent danger to others -- or over predictions of what will 
result from a particular behavior, e.g., will allowing euthanasia start us down a 
slippery slope to allowing other forms of taking a life. However, it is when the 
facts or likely outcomes are not in dispute and discussion breaks down -- over 
abortion, competing religious and political dogma, certain animal rights -- that we 
are faced with a conflict between competing fundamental values (or with the 
denial of moral values altogether) that debate alone cannot resolve. (Singer, 
1993, recommends we accept at least some moral point of view because it can 
give meaning to our lives, something beyond ourselves. The quest for meaning 
seems clear, but it seems questionable whether we can set out to give meaning 
to our life by embracing morality if it does not already fill that role.)  
2.2 The origin of morality probably lies in evolution. 
It seems likely that our moral sense -- the very existence and 'ought' of moral 
judgments as well as many of the particular moral precepts that exist -- has its 
origins in evolution. An innate sense of sympathy, tit-for-tat reciprocity and other 
similar traits probably provided evolutionary advantages when they first 
appeared, increasing the likelihood of the survival of the individual or perhaps a 
group with such shared characteristics. Individual choice, culture and, more 
generally, the sort of human brain given by evolution that allows for our apparent 
ability to choose and the creation of cultures can then take such morality far 
beyond what was given in evolution. As Nozick (2001) explains, deeply rooted 
norms become efficient ways for biology and/or culture to maintain the benefits of 
coordinated behavior...we don't need to reason through every situation, and 
norms may reinforce overall beneficial behavior when reasoning alone wouldn't 
get there (e.g., in 'Prisoner's Dilemma' situations where individuals do better only 
if both cooperate rather than act in their apparent self-interest). 
2.3 There isn't one moral theory. 
It's no surprise that specific moral intuitions and developed practices built on 
them have not yielded to a single principle of explanation (e.g., the greatest 
good). There is little reason for evolution to have crafted us (to the extent we are 
shaped by evolution) in a way that is simple, consistent or even clear to rational 
examination (let alone productive of our greatest overall happiness). Only net 
survival benefit counts for evolution. A behavior or rationale that provides a 
survival benefit in one situation may not in another situation, for which a different 
or even contrary behavior may be more appropriate. Some behaviors may also 
be the accidental consequence of something of great adaptive value, even if that 
by-product is itself not useful or even counter-productive.  
2.4 A complete moral realism is unlikely. 
Could it yet be possible that there are moral truths even if we cannot establish 
them by reason alone? The existence of transcendent, objective moral truths that 
we might somehow discover seems unlikely, though many or most believe in 
their existence (Joyce, 2010 has suggested that most moral philosophers -- 
though not most of all philosophers -- are probably believers, or they would have 
been unlikely to pursue moral philosophy). A more practical moral realism might 
mean that at least some principles exist which provide a path to a life which any 
one would choose if informed and freely able to choose (or they would at least be 
better off if they made such a choice). Such a morality might provide a key less to 
external nature than to the internal nature of a person (or perhaps all persons) -- 
to psychology. It seems at least possible that some prohibitions -- e.g., that it is 
wrong to murder innocents -- could fit this description given how widely shared 
are both the prohibitions and the belief of the effect on the individual of violating 
them; or, conversely, that some positive principles really exist, given the broad 
and cross-cultural desirability of certain character virtues such as courage. But 
prohibitions and principles it would be irrational not to follow are still short of 
moral obligations one is commanded to follow (though some feel otherwise). It 
also seems unlikely that there are moral truths of any kind that apply to all 
behaviors considered morally relevant given what we can see of the complex 
way psychological nature unfolds through biology and environment and the range 
of opinion on and apparent effects of various behaviors. Nietzsche for one 
thought authenticity and the exercise of the will more important than compassion. 
More conventionally, the split between conservative and liberal attitudes found in 
so many societies suggests at least a bifurcated set of moral principles and 
possible root psychology. 
  
2.5 Moral and philosophical disagreement is mostly psychological in origin. 
Purely philosophical discussion of morality cannot explain it, especially attempts 
to reduce it to a single principle. The most technical philosophical discussions 
often hinge on the intuitive acceptance or rejection of premises that simply seem 
reasonable or not to someone. Psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2001) has 
persuasively argued that morality is primarily driven by a range of intuitions and 
emotions, though moral discourse plays a role in persuading others if not a 
fundamental one in actually generating moral behavior. (This resonates both with 
traditional philosophical intuitionism -- morality grounded on directly perceived 
intuitions -- as well as with emotivism -- that morality is more a matter of 
emotional approval/disapproval than specific principles. See Miller, 2003, for a 
discussion of recent philosophical attempts to ground morality.) Similarly, Caputo 
(2000) has observed that ethical reasoning usually starts with conclusions, not 
premises. A better way to understand a moral judgment (or even the embrace of 
an entire moral philosophy) might be to look at the individual's temperament, 
upbringing, historical context, etc. and, for an entire philosophy, to recognize the 
tendencies to both over-generalize from one's own perspective and to broaden 
judgments and theories to encompass phenomena for which they may not be 
applicable. Ad hominem arguments don't refute facts or premises but can provide 
useful insights as to why someone's core beliefs, intuitions and speculations are 
what they are when there is little objective basis (or discernible progress) in 
deciding between competing points of view. (The same can be said about this 
author and the views expressed here. One can only be aware of some of the 
pitfalls and be as careful as possible.) 
3. Some people have unquestioned beliefs they view as absolute 
Some have an unquestioned and, for them, unquestionable conviction in the 
origin or purpose of the universe or in the way people must be treated, a 
conviction beyond reason that others cannot be persuaded of. We might broadly 
label all such convictions as religious. For such people tolerance of other views 
may not be acceptable or make sense. 
3.1 Unquestioned beliefs may benefit those who believe them. 
It could be argued that an unquestioned belief in the origin of the universe or the 
foundation of morality is a benefit to those who have it. Maybe such individuals 
possess a certain biological disposition to religious belief that is itself the result of 
evolution, e.g., people susceptible to such beliefs might be more inclined to 
sacrifice themselves in situations where it furthers the survival of those same 
genes in offspring and related group members. There is some evidence that 
religious belief is correlated with longer life expectancy. Similarly, there is 
evidence that people fare better with an optimistic or exaggerated, rather than 
realistic, sense of their own abilities or importance. In all these cases beliefs 
congruent with a rational examination of reality do not serve the individual as well 
as other beliefs (or an absence of beliefs, if 'ignorance is bliss'). This is not so 
surprising from an evolutionary viewpoint. Knowledge and realistic beliefs 
presumably provide certain evolutionary benefits, but perhaps not all the time 
and in all situations. 
3.2 Choosing to acquire an unquestioned belief is problematic. 
If there are benefits to unquestioned beliefs about the universe or morality should 
we then attempt to become such believers -- or optimists, or selectively ignorant -
- if we are not? Perhaps, if people are able to and so inclined. For many, setting 
out to believe in something without question is not attractive, and probably 
difficult to achieve, even if it can happen more or less unintended. It is also hard 
and unappealing to go back to a state in which one is ignorant of a problem or of 
the adequacy of a supposed solution. We might recognize such a state as 
providing greater happiness after it is attained but still reject it because choosing 
it is inconsistent with what currently makes us happy, such as valuing what we 
consider to be more (rather than less) knowledge of the world as it really is, or 
valuing the autonomy that such a state would seem to reduce. 
3.3 Experience machines, drugs and psychotherapy. 
Nozick (1974) says why we might not choose to hook ourselves up to 'experience 
machines' that could deliver any kind of reality we chose (e.g., the experience of 
writing a great novel) because we value our experience being real in addition to 
the experiences themselves. Something like this is probably part of some 
people's uneasiness about certain forms of psychopharmacology. Psychotherapy 
seems preferable for many because they think it effects its improvements by 
'really' transforming us -- our beliefs, behaviors and emotions -- rather than by 
giving us a drug-induced experience. But it's not clear from the evidence that 
psychotherapy always works this way, or that some drugs may not be as 
transformational (Kramer, 1993; some people report that the prescribed drugs 
allowed them to be their 'real selves'). There remain knotty problems here, 
though, in the end, drugs are not all that different from psychotherapy or any 
other form of personality manipulation (including religious conversion), all of 
which, if successful, ultimately result in changes in the brain that produce the 
desired effects with greater or less difficulty, with fewer or more undesirable side-
effects and with varying degrees of permanence and related changes (and the 
ability to deliberately reverse them). (Medication or therapy might also produce 
effects that we didn't explicitly want but with which we are happy, or at least 
newly tolerant. These might include effects that we not only didn't choose but 
would have avoided if we knew they would occur. Kramer reports that few 
patients he's aware of discontinue SSRI-type anti-depressants despite 
experiencing the not so uncommon sexual side-effect of delayed, or the inability 
to attain, orgasm, suggesting it's because patients so value the benefits of the 
medication. Reduced libido has also been reported with such drugs. However, it 
may be that some patients do not simply tolerate these unwanted side-effects but 
no longer experience them as undesirable in the same way. This fits with 
Kramer's idea that the drugs effect a broader transformation than simply 
addressing symptoms.) 
3.4 Do unquestioned beliefs imply anything about their truth? 
Does the conviction of people with deeply held religious or moral beliefs imply 
anything about the truth of those beliefs? To the extent that education tends to 
offset the inclinations of true believers, or that there is a correlation between non-
belief and education or intelligence -- both of which appear to be true -- such 
conviction does not provide strong support for the reality of beliefs that cannot be 
demonstrated but only seen as self-evident by those who so perceive them. Of 
course, humans are as fundamentally irrational as they are sometimes rational. 
4. We don't really have free will but can act as if we do 
The so-called compatibilist position embraced by some philosophers seems hard 
to refute: namely, that we seem to have free will (it is the only world we know), 
and might as well act as if we do (and treat people as responsible for their 
actions), but no, not really -- everything is physically determined. The only 
exception to complete physical determinism arises from quantum uncertainties -- 
the probabilistic nature of behavior at the level of elementary particles. In 
principle this uncertainty continues all the way up to our macro reality, but is so 
rare at that level as to be safely ignored. Some have argued that these quantum 
uncertainties are nonetheless what give us freely chosen human behavior, but 
the arguments for this are so far unconvincing. Still, the puzzle of how conscious 
observation of a physical state resolves these quantum uncertainties remains. 
5. Brains are conscious but we don't know how. 
Consciousness is a puzzle. It seems the brain alone gives rise to consciousness 
-- there is no good evidence for a soul or for irreducible pieces of consciousness 
making us self-aware -- but we don't understand how the brain does it and 
probably never will, as least as it applies to our experience of qualia, the 
particular sensations of sound, color, pain, etc. No matter how much brain 
function we can imagine understanding, and no matter how tightly correlated that 
function is shown to be with the minutiae of these experiences, there appears to 
be an irreducible 'explanatory gap' between the most we can ever say about 
neurons or electrical fields in the brain and the tangible experience of reality. 
How does anything we can learn or theorize about the brain explain the 
particularities of the raw sensations we feel? Suggestions that certain physical or 
structural states are simply identical with these experiences and explain them as 
completely as they can be explained are as unsatisfactory and seem as 
incomplete as claims that the universe originated from nothing and there is no 
more to be said about the matter. (This 'mysterian' position regarding 
consciousness was first discussed at length in McGinn, 1989. See also 
Krellenstein, 1995.)  
5.1 We're unlikely to be able to explain consciousness. 
As with the origin of the universe, it's conceivable to imagine the discovery of 
concepts so different from those we now possess that a solution to the problem 
of explaining qualia will somehow be possible. But we have no reason to believe 
it for this problem either. It's true that other past scientific problems -- what makes 
something alive, for example -- seemed unsolvable but were later solved. But no 
such scientific problem (other than, indeed, the problem of the ultimate origin of 
the universe) seems (or seemed) to have quite the conceptual difficulties of the 
consciousness problem. 
5.2 Machines can be conscious but we don't know how. 
If the brain alone produces consciousness then it seems possible that an artificial 
machine could be built that would be conscious. In this view we are ourselves 
just such a machine. Based on what we understand about the brain as an 
information processing engine it's reasonable to believe that a computer with the 
rights sorts of inputs and outputs from and to the real world, and possibly made 
of the right materials, could power the brain part of a conscious machine. 
Arguments that a particular limitation of computers makes it impossible for such a 
machine to be built can't always be conclusively refuted but are not really 
relevant, since we can't see how the physiology of the brain could produce 
consciousness and could produce similar arguments showing it to be impossible, 
though in the case of the human brain we have the brute fact that it happens. If it 
turns out we are never able to understand how that happens for a brain then we 
may never be able to know how to construct such a conscious machine (except, 
perhaps, as an indirect or accidental consequence of some construction), but 
that will not make it any less possible in principle. 
6. We live by personal values, biological dispositions, upbringing, habit and 
choice. 
The existentialist accepts nihilism but aims to counter it with acts of will and 
choice, creating value where none exists to start. This may be a good strategy for 
a nihilist to try to live by, though what will work for one may not for another. More 
significantly, a modern nihilism forces us in the end to reject the claim that the 
existentialist can necessarily create value in more than a personal sense through 
acts of will...some may experience that, others not...and these acts will not 
necessarily persuade others of the value of a particular course of action. As a 
practical matter, we have deep-rooted beliefs, or at least deeply felt emotions 
about what we want or believe is or isn't acceptable even if we can't offer 
completely convincing explanations to ourselves or others and don't view them 
as absolutes. Personal values -- the values we have and adopt even if we can't 
consider them absolute -- play a significant role in living the life we do. To the 
extent we examine our beliefs (and we may not very much or at all) we may 
adopt a pragmatic viewpoint, accepting certain things as quasi-foundational. We 
then reason (or more often rationalize after the fact, if Haidt is correct) from such 
beliefs as we have and towards such goals as we have and choose (to the extent 
we choose them). We choose to be with others with similar values...or to express 
ourselves...or value others...or maximize our sensual pleasures (or, more 
commonly, some combination of these and others) and perhaps we choose 
some of these because, for us, there really is no other choice...or some choices 
work better for us even if we can't ground that choice in anything beyond dispute. 
Some things we do because of temperament and/or because we were raised that 
way (learning morality has been likened to learning a particular language: a 
natural proclivity is elaborated with a certain set of rules, but the specifics can 
vary...no one rule is absolutely right any more than one language is) -- and 
choose to so raise others (or just fall into doing so) -- or there was another 
reason we did them initially but they become habitual (and habits are extremely 
useful time and effort savers). The psychology of 'functional autonomy' suggests 
that whatever is habitual may become valued in its own right. We come to 
accept, or not, the absence of clear foundations and the limitations in our 
understanding. 
7. We don't know how much we can modify ourselves, what makes up happy or 
what we value. 
Human nature has in part evolved and been encoded in biology, at least in the 
form of underlying tendencies. Our culture also places limitations on us, or 
makes some choices much harder or easier than others. There is an interesting 
list of behaviors found in all cultures, e.g., sexual jealousy and modesty. 
However, what is natural or culturally produced (and they are often at odds), 
even if found among all people, still has no automatic claim to being of 
paramount value, of making us happy or of being unchangeable. But just how 
changeable are we? 
7.1 There can be a cost in curtailing biologically based tendencies. 
Frustrating a biological tendency can result in (negatively experienced) 
frustration. This frustration may be reduced or not experienced negatively if in 
exchange we perceive a personal benefit, or a social benefit that returns an 
indirect personal benefit (e.g., general prohibitions against violence). It may be 
possible to further reduce or eliminate frustration if the tendency can be modified 
through learning or habitual non-practice. Freud thought our biological and 
primarily sexual 'instincts' could be transformed, and needed to be for the sake of 
civilization, though he didn't think satisfaction of the transformed ('sublimated') 
instincts could be as pleasurable as satisfaction of the original. Few believe today 
that all our pleasures and activities derive their psychic energy from sex or other 
basic instincts. But we sometimes perceive connections or experience 
passionate pleasure from different activities in a similar way, possibly indicating 
conflated origins and a common neurophysiology. 
(August, 2005) 
7.2 Deliberate change 
We choose to develop interests or acquire tastes but have less control over our 
personality or what is most important to us. Some changes may be forced on us, 
or become a part of us through daily routine. We can work towards personal and 
social transformation and deliberately build some changes in ourselves and 
others over time, to some extent. Individual variability and external reinforcement 
play a significant role in what's possible. Most people can learn to control urges 
for revenge. Some choose celibacy without apparent cost (how many?), while for 
many monogamy is difficult to sustain or not really embraced in the first place, or 
exists for a period of time in a state of tension. Pinker (1997) casts doubt on the 
1960's ambitions of free love and an egalitarian society, arguing persuasively for 
the widespread existence, likely evolutionary origins and great difficulty in 
overcoming sexual jealousy and competition. Modern day capitalism has lately 
run rampant over any alternative economic model in its appeal to a view of 
human nature based on universal and mostly unmodifiable self-interest and 
competition. But just how desirable (or undesirable) and unchangeable are which 
tendencies? 
(January, 2006) 
7.3 The significance of sex differences 
It's known that the physiology and brains of men and women are different, and 
there's little doubt that there are some differences between men's and women's 
average characteristics and behaviors that are primarily the result of these 
underlying biological differences. There are also differences due mostly to the 
effects of culture, as well as presumed differences that empirical testing does or 
might indicate are not really true differences at all. Such differences as have 
been established are relatively small and of a usually unknown mix of biological 
and cultural factors. These differences do not seem to determine or limit the 
characteristics of a given individual, e.g., although men are stronger than women 
on average (probably partly because of cultural differences but also because 
men tend to be larger), any given woman may be as strong or stronger than any 
given man. As a result, these average differences between the sexes are of very 
limited use in determining what any given individual might or might not be 
capable of, excel at or find pleasure in. And while characteristics of mostly 
biological origin may sometimes be more difficult to change, average differences 
of usually unknown (or even of known) origin don't help much in determining just 
how hard or easy changing a particular characteristic will be for a given 
individual. However, this does not mean that understanding such differences is of 
no use at all. It's possible to consider stereotypes as primarily empirical claims 
about the average characteristics of a group. The negative connotation of 
stereotyping applies mostly to situations where the claims are false or 
erroneously assumed to apply to all individuals in the group and/or are used in 
place of (and sometimes despite even knowing) the actual characteristics of the 
individual. It may also be a problem when stereotyped differences are wrongly 
assumed to be unchangeable (which is more often attributed to stereotypes 
believed to be biological in origin). But an accurate stereotype may provide at 
least some information when more specific or useful information is not available 
or possible. Forced to choose randomly from a group of men or women for a task 
requiring great strength one would be better off choosing from the group of men. 
A much harder question is to what extent a true stereotype -- of people in general 
and in all cultures (i.e., a so-called fact or at least statistical claim about mostly 
biologically determined human nature) or of men or women in particular -- should 
be used in combination with other available information. Even if the individual in 
question is oneself or someone else known first-hand there is often insufficient 
information for making important judgments. If a stereotype is valid and of 
sufficient magnitude it could be reasonable to consider it as a clue or best guess 
about the existence or strength of an uncertain characteristic or behavior, though 
giving it its proper due (and no more) may be difficult. In reality there are few 
stereotypes of usefulness that are certain or of clearly known strength compared 
to individual factors we may know directly...the greater parenting drive or 
capability of women? the greater promiscuity of men? And any such established 
statistical difference, can, again, make no automatic claim to be being 
unchangeable (whether mostly biological or cultural), productive of our happiness 
or of intrinsic value. But it may sometimes be reasonable to assess the evidence 
for and strength of these purported average differences and see what if any role 
they might play in the decisions we make. 
(October, 2006) 
8. Morality is real, but nihilism about its foundations can't be avoided 
Steven Pinker (2002) observes that an evolutionary basis for morality invites 
nihilism (i.e., moral nihilism -- the view that there are no objective moral truths) 
because of the nature of evolutionary adaptation, which happens by chance and 
persists because of its survival value. Pinker thinks nihilism can be avoided 
because moral behavior may have evolved in conformance with an objective 
morality grounded in the logic and benefits of reciprocal, cooperative behavior -- 
it's hard to argue someone has an obligation without being similarly obliged, and 
we benefit overall from certain behaviors. Even if there isn't an objective morality, 
Pinker argues that our moral sense is 'real for us' and can't simply be dismissed. 
But the logic of reciprocal obligation only applies if we already accept someone 
having an obligation to do something rather than just finding it desirable; not 
wanting you to hurt me doesn't imply you have an obligation not to hurt me (see 
Harman in Harman & Thomson, 1996) or what might be the resulting obligation 
for me not to hurt you. The net benefits of cooperation also do not imply 
obligations; a given individual (or nation state) at a particular time may well be 
better served by acting selfishly. While morality is still 'real for us,' this too falls 
short of the objective grounding of morality needed to refute nihilism. That does 
not mean that moral practice and discussion are an unimportant part of our lives 
or that we are not willing to live by, defend and enforce those practices. But our 
beliefs and their defense cannot be grounded in more than our individual and 
community determination to pursue certain goals and adhere to certain norms of 
conduct. (See Krellenstein, 2006.) 
(December, 2009) 
8.1 We would be better off not using the word 'moral' 
Given the widespread but apparently false belief that there are true, absolute 
moral values we would probably be better off eliminating from our vocabulary the 
words that imply the existence of such values -- words such as 'moral', 'right' and 
'wrong'. Such 'moral abolitionism' has been suggested by others who deny the 
existence of moral absolutes, including Greene (2002), Burgess (in an early 
unpublished work finally published in 2007) and Garner (2007). It would likely be 
better to refer to positions one favors or opposes rather than describe them as 
'right' or 'wrong'. This would not prevent us from reasoning about values and their 
implications. It would also not prevent us from adopting and living by particular 
values we believe are in our interest, supporting/condemning actions vigorously 
or choosing to punish or fight those who violate norms we endorse. But it would 
eliminate language that implies there are values or obligations that command 
obedience of oneself or another because of their objective truth. Discussing 
values as personal (if sometimes widely shared) and relative would likely make 
'moral' disagreements less intractable and more like other disagreements, 
increasing the possibilities for compromise. Compromise would not be required 
(nothing is)...but the choice would be more accurately focused as a practical 
decision to compromise or not rather than a decision that allows no compromise 
by definition. 
Some who believe that moral values are not absolute (e.g., Joyce, 2001) 
nevertheless think we might be better retaining the fiction of moral absolutes and 
continue to speak of 'right' and 'wrong'...that such talk would better reinforce the 
shared values a community has, providing a net benefit. Whether this is the case 
is, as Joyce and others have observed, an empirical question, but one might 
hope that people could see values for what they are and learn to better 
understand and reason about differences in them while still respecting their 
importance. (One exception to eliminating the language of moral realism (i.e., 
that there are objective moral truths) might be for raising children, where a 
simpler approach may be needed to encourage particular behaviors. Greene 
(2002) observes that we might "simply allow or even encourage realist dialogue 
with those who are too young to handle the meta-ethical truth [that there are no 
moral absolutes]"(p. 279).) 
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